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Recent Case
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DIVORCE DURATIONAL
RESIDENCY STATUTE-MOOTNESS-MAINTENANCE OF
CLASS ACTION AFTER MOOTING OF
NAMED REPRESENTATIVE'S CLAIM
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
States have traditionally demanded satisfaction of a durational
residency requirement before they will grant divorces to persons
who have recently arrived within their borders. Nevada, long re-
puted as a divorce haven, is no exception. New arrivals must sat-
isfy a six-week waiting period before they can gain access to the di-
vorce courts of that state.' Rhode Island is at the other end of the
spectrum, demanding two years of residency.2 The other states
vary between these two extremes, one year being the most common
requirement.
In recent years, doubts have arisen concerning the continued valid-
ity of these statutory residency requirements. On three occasions
since 1969, the Supreme Court has invalidated statutes imposing
durational residency requirements. 3  In each case it was held that
the constitutional right of interstate travel had been infringed by
the statutory waiting period. Another series of decisions of the
Court suggested that restrictions on access to divorce courts might
present denials of due process. 4  In Sosna v. Iowa,5 both lines of
authority converged to serve as a basis for challenging the consti-
tutionality of Iowa's one-year divorce durational residency statute.
1. NEVADA REV. STAT. § 125.020 (1963). Idaho also has a six-week require-
ment. IDAHO CODE § 32-701 (1963).
It is important to distinguish residence from domicile. Residence is physical
presence within the jurisdiction. Domicile requires physical presence coupled with
the Intention of remaining indefinitely. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICr OF LAws 9 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WEINTRAUB]. The word "resi-
dence" in divorce durational residency statutes is usually construed to mean domicile.
H. CLARK, LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 314 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
2. R.I. GE. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-12 (1969).
3. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (nonemergency
medical services for indigents); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare benefits).
4. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I
(1967); cf. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (dictum); United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973) (dictum).
5. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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In August of 1972, Carol Maureen Sosna, having previously
separated from her husband, took her children and left her home in
New York for Green Island, Iowa. The following month she insti-
tuted divorce proceedings in an Iowa state court. Her actions proved
premature, since Iowa law requires that the petitioner in a divorce
proceeding must have lived in that state for a minimum of one year
before a court has jurisdiction of the request for marital dissolu-
6tion.
After the court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction, Mrs. Sosna
filed a class action in federal court seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief. She contended that the Iowa statute had denied her
and others similarly situated equal protection of the law by discrim-
inating against newly arrived residents solely because they had ex-
ercised their constitutional right of interstate travel.7  The three-
judge district court8 rejected Mrs. Sosna's claim and found the
statute constitutional,9 but the Supreme Court granted her petition
for certiorari.
By the time Sosna v. Iowa finally reached the Supreme Court,
the plaintiff had not only satisfied the one-year residency require-
ment, but had obtained a divorce in New York. This required the
Court to consider the mootness issue before addressing the consti-
tutionality of the Iowa statute.' While the mootness doctrine
seemed to prevent Mrs. Sosna from pursuing the case on her own be-
half, her representation of the class might be considered still to
6. IowA CODE § 598.6 (1971).
7. For a discussion of the history and development of the right to interstate
travel, see Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Constitution, 44
N.Y.U.L. REV. 989 (1969).
It has been held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment protects the
right to international travel. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
While the Supreme Court has never directly considered the issue, the right to
intrastate travel has been recognized. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255 (1964)
(Douglas, J., concurring); King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442
F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971); Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
8. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2281, 1970, a three-judge district court is authorized when
a state statute or administrative order is challenged, a state officer is a party defendant,
injunctive relief is sought, and it is claimed that the statute or order is contrary to
the United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 spells out the procedure to be
followed in such a case. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 188-94 (1970).
9. Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Iowa 1973).
10. "When all of a plaintiffs current claims against defendant have been ex-
tinguished by subsequent events . . . and the plaintiff can make no plausible allega-
tions of future injury, the Court will declare the case moot." Note, The Mootness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1974). See DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971); Powell
v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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present a case or controversy satisfying article III, section 2 of the
Constitution. The Court found that its jurisdiction was properly in-
voked."
The basis of the Court's opinion was the realization that the de-
lays inherent in the appeal process would always prevent a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the residency requirement if the
mootness doctrine were applied mechanically. This immunity to
appellate review was overcome by invoking the doctrine of Southern
Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC:'2 A case will not be ruled moot when it
presents issues which are "capable of repetition, yet [evade] re-
view." 3  The doctrine was applicable, since the Court determined
that Iowa would continue to enforce the one-year residency require-
ment against the members of the class, none of whom was capable
of mounting a timely challenge.'
4
Even though the constitutional problem of mootness was re-
solved, it was still necessary to deal with mootness in the context of
the class action provisions contained in rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The specific requirements of rule 23 demand
that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class." This subsection has been interpreted as
containing two distinct elements, both of which must be satisfied.
5
The first demands a coincidence of the interests of the representa-
tive party with those of the class. A lack of antagonism between
representative and class' 6 or the absence of a conflict of interest
7
are sufficient to satisfy this element. The second element requires
that competent counsel must represent the class.'
8
The Court had little problem in finding that the first element was
11. 419 U.S. at 399. The recent case of DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974), is an excellent example of the operation of the mootness doctrine when an
individual brings an action solely on his own behalf.
12. 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
13. Id. at 515.
14. The Court relied on its implicit holding in Dunn V. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 333 (1972), for the proposition that repeated enforcement of the statute against
members of the class is sufficient to overcome the mooting of the named representa-
tive's claim.
15. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Note, The Class
Representative: The Problem of the Absent Plaintiffs, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1133 (1974).
16. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Phillips v. Klassen, 502 F.2d 362
(1974).
17. Vernon J. Reckler & Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 335 (D.
Minn. 1971).
18. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Dolgow v.
Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Mersay v. First Republic Steel Corp. of
America, 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 2307[l] (2d ed. 1974); VII C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1766 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
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met, since it was "difficult to imagine why any person in the class ap-
pellant represents would have an interest in seeing Iowa Code 598.6
[the divorce waiting period] upheld."' 9 As for the performance of
counsel, the Court felt that the interests of the ciass had been "com-
petently urged at each level of the proceeding ....
Justice White, the lone dissenter from the mootness aspect of the
Court's holding,21 fashioned a two-pronged challenge to the major-
ity opinion. The first prong focused on the constitutional issue em-
bodied in the mootness doctrine. Justice White's position was that
since the plaintiff no longer had a personal stake in the outcome of
the case, she did not have the standing to continue representing the
class. Absent a named member of the class who could direct coun-
sel and ensure that class interests were being properly served, he felt
that the case had become one-sided and lost the adversary quality
necessary to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of article
III.
The second prong centered on what Justice White considered a
dilution of the requirements of rule 23. The thrust of this position
was that the case should have been remanded to the district court
for consideration of the adequacy-of-representation issue. It should
be noted, however, that the district court had already passed on
these factors in its original determination of whether a class action
could be maintained. Since what constitutes adequate representa-
tion is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each
case,22 a district court's decision should stand unless an abuse of dis-
cretion is shown.23 Justice White offered no evidence of such abuse
to support his position.
A further response to Justice White's criticism of the Court's
treatment of rule 23 lies in the fact that the majority's holding, that a
class action does not become moot even though the claim of the
named representative has been mooted on appeal, is consistent with
the theoretical basis of rule 23. The class action device is an out-
growth of the practice of permissivejoinder.2 4 Thus, properly viewed,
a class action involves the separate and distinct claims of each
member of the class as well as those of the named representative. 25
19. 419 U.S. at 403 n.13.
20. Id. at 403.
21. Although Justice Marshall, who was joined by Justice Brennan, provided an
additional dissent, he directed his arguments to the merits of the case and made no
mention of the mootness issue. Id. at 418-27.
22. WRIGHT & MILLER § 1765.
23. Id.
24. Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DUKE L.J. 573, 589 n.65.
25. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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Underlying Sosna is the recognition that the multiple claims be-
longing to class members still existed after the plaintiff's own claim
was mooted.
Although the continued existence of a personal stake in the con-
troversy is not mandated by rule 23,26 such an interest is necessary in
order to meet the constitutional requirements of standing.27  How-
ever, strong policy considerations support a relaxation of standing
requirements in class actions where the named representative loses
his claim. One such consideration is that a defendant guilty of
wrongdoing which affects a number of persons may try to settle with
the individual who brings a class action in hopes of being permitted
to continue his conduct with respect to the remainder.28 In Jenkins
v. United Gas Corp.,2 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals would not
dismiss such a case. A contrary holding would have necessitated
that each aggrieved person bring an action before the illegal conduct
could be put to an end. A defendant's settlement with the class rep-
resentative parallels the problem posed by Sosna, where a dura-
tional residency requirement is inevitably satisfied before it can be
challenged on the appellate level.
Justice White acknowledged the practical considerations in the
standing issue, but questioned whether such considerations justified
liberal construction of standing requirements.
Article III . . . is an "awkward" limitation. It prevents all
federal courts from addressing some important questions;
there is nothing surprising in the fact that it may permit
only the lower federal courts to address other questions.
Article III is not a rule always consistent with judicial
economy. Its overriding purpose is to define the boun-
daries separating the branches and to keep this Court from
assuming a legislative perspective and function. The ulti-
mate basis of the Court's decision must be a conclusion that
the issue presented is an important and recurring one
which should be finally resolved here. But this notion can-
not override constitutional limitations.30
26. See Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal
of the Class Representative, supra note 24, at 604.
27. The doctrine of standing requires that the party seeking relief must have
"[A]lleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
28. Bledsoe, Mootness and Standing in Class Actions, I FLA. ST. L. REv. 430,
444-45 (1973).
29. 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
30. 419 U.S. at 418 (White, J., dissenting).
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Relying on practical considerations to expand the standing doc-
trine would appear to produce tension with the proposition that
standing is a constitutional requirement and not a doctrine of judi-
cial self-restraint.3 ' If standing limitations were self-imposed, there
could be no serious objection to the Court's shifting the boundaries
of that doctrine in order to accommodate pragmatic considerations.
When viewed as a constitutional limitation, however, the Court is
bound to enforce standing requirements even if less rigid enforce-
ment would produce more favorable results. The latitude that the
Court is willing to allow by relaxing standing requirements can be
justified by recognizing that the words "case or controversy" con-
tained in article III are so broad as to make any constitutional limi-
tations in regard to mootness or standing a discretionary exercise of
judicial self-restraint.32
Having thus decided that the class action was not moot, the
Court turned to the right-to-travel issue. The ultimate resolution of
the question was provided when Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion
joined by five other members of the Court, rejected both lines of au-
thority that seemed to militate toward invalidating the residency
requirement and found Iowa's one-year period to be a legitimate
exercise of legislative power.
The decision was based on several grounds. Dissolution of
the marital status and its concomitant effect on the property rights of
spouses, as well as on the custody and support of children, justify a
state's insistence on a significant relationship with at least one of the
parties to the marriage. A state also has a valid interest in preven-
ting forum-shopping in divorce actions and in the protection of its
divorce decrees from collateral attacks by other states. Finally,
states have historically been granted deference in regulating
divorce.
The Sosna decision marked the culmination of a conflict in the
courts which began in 1970 when a federal court held Wisconsin's
two-year divorce residency statute unconstitutional.33 In the next
four years, 18 other courts were confronted with similar challenges,
31. It is unclear whether the early decisions of the Court concerning mootness
considered it a constitutional or a common law doctrine. Note, Mootness on Appeal
in the Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672, 1675 (1970). The Court's current
position is that the mootness doctrine is based on the case or controversy require-
ment of article III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974); SEC v. Medical
Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
32. Note, Cases Moot on Appeal: A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 U. PA. L.
REV. 772 (1955).
33. Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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and divorce waiting periods were invalidated on six of these
occasions.
34
The cornerstone of the challenge to divorce durational residency
statutes was Shapiro v. Thompson.35 In Shapiro, the Court con-
cluded that both Congress and the states had denied equal protec-
tion of the laws to persons deprived of welfare benefits by statutes
imposing one-year residency requirements. 6 Neither side disputed
that the effect of the one-year waiting period was "to create two
classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each
other" except for the length of their residency in the jurisdiction."
The controversy centered around the applicable standard of judicial
review. In support of the validity of the waiting period, it was ar-
gued that a disparity in treatment between classes of residents could
be justified by the state's demonstration that a rational basis existed
for the distinction. 3 8  The Court declined to employ this minimal
standard of judicial scrutiny, noting that persons moving between
states or to the District of Columbia were exercising their constitu-
tional right to interstate travel, and that "any classification which
serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be nec-
essary to promote a compelling governmental interest [was] uncon-
stitutional. 39
34. After Wymelenberg, divorce durational residency statutes were held un-
constitutional in Rosado v. Smith, Civil No. 72-3361-W (D. Mass., Feb. 1974); McCay
v. South Dakota, 366 F. Supp. 1244 (D.S.D. 1973); Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp.
305 (D.R.I. 1973); Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973).
The opposite conclusion was reached in Makres v. Askew, 500 F.2d 577 (5th
Cir. 1974), affig. Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Mendez v.
Heller, 380 F. Supp. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D.
Iowa 1973); Caizza v. Caizza, 291 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1974); Whitehead v. Whitehead,
53 Hawaii 302, 492 P:2d 939 (1972); Davis v. Davis, 210 N.W.2d 221 (Minn. 1973);
Ashley v. Ashley, 191 Neb. 824, 217 N.W.2d 926 (1974); Porter v. Porter, 112 N.H.
403, 296 A.2d 900 (1972); Sternshuss v. Sternshuss, 71 Misc. 2d 552, 336 N.Y.S.2d
586 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St. 2d 155, 291 N.E.2d 530
(1972); Stottlemeyer v. Stottlemeyer, 451 Pa. 579, 302 A.2d 830 (1973); Place v.
Place, 129 Vt. 326, 278 A.2d 710 (1971).
35. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
36. Statutes from Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia were
involved. Congressional legislation for the District of Columbia is not subject to the
constraints of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme
Court has ruled, however, that equal protection is guaranteed to persons in the Dis-
trict of Columbia by means of the fifth amendment's due process clause. Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
37. 394 U.S. at 627.
38. "State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional
power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
39. 394 U.S. at 634 (Court's emphasis). If a legislative enactment restricts the
1976"1
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In its search for this compelling interest, the Court rejected sev-
eral proposed justifications for the one-year waiting period. The
state relied primarily on the argument that the requirement was
necessary to protect the "fiscal integrity' 40 of the state welfare
program by discouraging an influx of indigents who would use
funds otherwise available for long term residents. The Court re-
fused to accept deterrence of indigents as a legitimate state purpose.
The Court also found that there was no need for a durational resi-
dency requirement to provide an "efficient rule of thumb ' 1 for
determining residency and preventing fraud, as other methods were
already employed to ascertain the legitimacy of a welfare appli-
cant's residency.42
A shortcoming of the Shapiro decision was the Court's failure to
define what it considered to be a penalty on the right to travel.
Since all durational residency requirements are penalties to a cer-
tain extent, a literal reading of Shapiro would result in the invali-
dation of every such statute. The Court concerned itself with the
immediate factual situation before it and failed to delineate a frame-
work of analysis for future right-to-travel cases. The only indication
of the Court's awareness of the consequences of its holding was a
terse footnote suggesting that some residency requirements might
not penalize travel, while others might be supported by compelling
interests.
4 3
The Court's next right-to-travel decision, Dunn v. Blumstein, 4
did little to solve the "penalty" problem created by Shapiro. In
Dunn, a one-year residency requirement established by Tennessee
as a qualification for voting was declared unconstitutional. The
Court relied upon alternate holdings. First, the Tennessee statute
exercise of a fundamental right, or if its impact falls upon a suspect classification,
it is unconstitutional unless the state can demonstrate a compelling interest. A
fundamental right is a right guaranteed by the Constitution. San Antonio School
Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Examples of fundamental rights are the right
to privacy (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)) and the right to vote (Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969)). Statutes discriminating on the
basis of race are the best examples of suspect classifications. See, e.g., McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
The applicable standard of review in equal protection cases has been thoroughly
discussed in Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969).
40. 394 U.S. at 627.
41. Id. at 636.
42. "Before granting an application, the welfare authorities investigate the ap-
plicant's employment, housing, and family situation and in the course of the inquiry
necessarily learn the facts upon which to determine whether the applicant is a resi-
dent." Id.
43. Id. at 638 n.21.
44. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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was held to be a restriction on the fundamental right to vote.45
Second, the Court paralleled Shapiro by holding that the one-year
waiting period was a penalty on the right to travel 6  Both findings
required the use of the compelling-interest test.
47
As in Shapiro, justifications tendered in support of the waiting
period did not survive the Court's inspection. While it was permis-
sible for a state to limit the franchise to bona fide residents, a dura-
tional residency requirement excluded some persons who were in
fact bona fide residents but who had been in the state for less than a
year. Criminal fraud sanctions, cross-checks of registered voters in
other states, and objective evidence of bona fide residency such as a
driver's license and a place of employment, were viewed as viable
alternatives to the one-year residency requirement.48  Nor did the
Court find a compelling interest in Tennessee's claim that residency
of one year provided for an informed electorate, since recently ar-
rived residents could conceivably be better informed than lifelong
residents.
49
In Dunn, as in Shapiro, the Court did not undertake to set out
with precision the test for determining what a penalty on travel was.
The Court made the sweeping conclusion that "[t]he right to travel is
an 'unconditional personal right,' a right whose exercise may not be
conditioned," but the Court did not go on to define the parameters
of the right. Therefore, while it is clear that the Tennessee statute
was a restriction on the fundamental right to vote, it is uncertain to
what extent this was relevant to the finding that travel had been
penalized. It can be forcefully argued that the Court found that the
right to travel had been abridged only because of the seriousness of
the penalty on travel. The fact that the right to vote had been in-
fringed was by itself sufficient grounds for striking down the
statute.5 0  Additional reliance upon the right to travel was an unnec-
essary complication.5 1
45. Id. at 336-37. In San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
the Court qualified Dunn by noting that the right to vote, per se, is not a constitu-
tionally protected right. The right emerges only when a state has adopted an elective
process for determining who will represent any segment of its population. At that
point a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate on the same footing
with other members of the jurisdiction's populace. 411 U.S. at 34 n.74, 35 n.76.
The Court has upheld very short durational residency requirements for voting.
Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Martson v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (50
days).
46. 405 U.S. at 338-42.
47. Id. at 335.
48. Id. at 348.
49. Id. at 354-56.
50. See note 39 supra.
51. An alternative explanation of Dunn may be found in those cases which
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The Court's most recent right-to-travel decision prior to Sosna
was Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.5 2  In Memorial Hos-
pital, the Court struck down an Arizona statute which required
an indigent to have been a resident of an Arizona county for one
year in order to be eligible for free nonemergency medical care.
Citing Shapiro as precedent, the Court ruled that the waiting period
was an unwarranted penalty on travel.
The Court acknowledged that its prior decisions in Dunn and
Shapiro failed to clarify the weight of the penalty on travel needed to
trigger the compelling-interest test. Conceding that "any dura-
tional residency requirement impinges to some extent on the right to
travel,"53 the Court nevertheless left the determination of the "ulti-
mate parameters of the Shapiro penalty analysis" '54 to later
decisions, thus indicating that the "unconditional personal right"
language of Dunn was not to be followed. Significantly, the Court
observed that the "necessities of life" involved in Shapiro and the
fundamental right to vote involved in Dunn presented a distinct con-
trast to other conceivable penalties on travel. The medical services
involved in Memorial Hospital were viewed as falling within the
"necessities of life" category controlled by the Shapiro decision. 5
The evaluation of the nature and degree of the penalty on travel
undertaken by the Court in Memorial Hospital offers little guidance
in determining the constitutionality of other types of durational resi-
dency requirements. If the penalty of travel is the deprivation of a
fundamental right, as in Dunn, there is little doubt that the waiting
period will be struck down. This would be true, however, even
without resort to a right-to-travel analysis.16  Consequently, uncer-
tainty is injected by Shapiro and Memorial Hospital, because it was
found that travel was penalized by denying rights to newly arrived
residents. Even though the statutes affecting those rights would not
necessarily be subjected to intense judicial scrutiny, the Court, with-
out clarifying the parameters of the decisions, applied the
compelling-interest test because of the right-to-travel issue.
recognize that it may be unconstitutional to deny an individual a combination of
certain rights, even though it might not be unconstitutional to deny one of those rights
by itself. For example, in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
the Court held that wealth discrimination per se is not unconstitutional. It is invalid
only when it denies certain rights to the poor.
52. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
53. Id. at 255-57.
54. Id. at 257-59.
55. Id. at 259.
56. As noted previously, Dunn relied upon alternate holdings. The fact that the
fundamental right to vote had been penalized was grounds in itself to invoke the
compelling-interest test. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
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Viewing this problem in the context of Shapiro, it is important to
note that even though the Court on several occasions has evidenced a
special sensitivity to statutes affecting welfare benefits, there are
other instances where such statutes have been upheld by the mere
demonstration of a rational basis justification.57  The pressing im-
portance of finding a resolution to the issue raised by Shapiro and
Dunn is emphasized by considering the difficulties which could arise
when an attempt is made to analyze other important but nonfunda-
mental rights in the right-to-travel context. For example, it cannot
easily be predicted how the Court would handle a durational resi-
dency requirement on public housing, a problem which has arisen in
the lower courts.58  Housing is no doubt a necessity of life, yet the
Court has been content to extend limited review to a forcible de-
tainer statute of dubious social value.5 9 Similar problems are posed
by waiting periods on newly arrived attorneys who wish to be admit-
ted to the bar of their new state of residence.6 °
In Sosna, the Court once again bypassed an opportunity to issue
a dispositive statement on what constitutes a penalty on travel, im-
posing instead a limitation on the expansion of the right-to-travel
analysis but giving no hint as to how this limit relates to other areas
to which the right-to-travel argument may be applied. What is
more distressing is the Court's failure to mention what standard of
review it was applying to Iowa's divorce waiting period. There is
evidence that the Court's scrutiny was limited to a search for a ra-
tional basis: "Iowa's residency requirement may reasonably be jus-
tified on grounds other than purely budgetary considerations or
57. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970), where the Court
emphasized that "[w]elfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing,
housing, and medical care," with Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richard-
son v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 417 (1970),
in which the Court extended minimal scrutiny to welfare statutes. Cf. Goodpaster,
The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's
Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REv. 223, 224 (1970), where the
author notes in reference to Dandridge v. Williams, supra:
Perhaps the decision was predictable. The Court, in its recent equal protec-
tion decisions, while pointing to some important considerations, has failed
to articulate an even relatively consistent and objective equal protection
and due process standard by which one might reliably determine and judge
state duties to the indigent.
58. King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.
1971); Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
59. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
60. The Court has ruled that there are limitations on a state's right to exclude
persons from the practice of law. Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232
(1957). Courts were confronted with judging the constitutionality of bar admission
waiting periods in Smith v. Davis, 350 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. W. Va. 1972) and Keenan
v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
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administrative convenience." 61  These words are not typical of the
language which usually heralds application of the compelling-
interest analysis. The proposition that a rational basis sufficed in
Sosna finds additional support in the manner in which Shapiro,
Dunn, and Memorial Hospital were distinguished. It was empha-
sized that Mrs. Sosna
[W]as not irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining some part
of what she sought, as was the case with the welfare recipi-
ents in Shapiro, the voters in Dunn, or the indigent patient
in Maricopa County. She would eventually qualify for the
same sort of adjudication which she demanded virtually
upon her arrival in the state.
62
What the Court seems to be saying is that travel is not signifi-
cantly penalized, and hence, only a rational basis test is warranted
if the newly arrived resident does not suffer irretrievable loss of a
benefit during the waiting period. This was the interpretation which
Justice Marshall in his dissent gave to the Court's means of dis-
tinguishing Sosna from prior right-to-travel cases.63
Regardless of the standard of review applied, the discomforting
factor in Justice Rehnquist's opinion is that the basis for distin-
guishing Sosna from prior decisions will offer no guidance in deter-
mining what other durational residency statutes are insignificant
penalties on travel requiring only a rational basis justification. By
defining "penalty" as an irretrievable loss of a benefit and by plac-
ing emphasis on the fact that Mrs. Sosna did not suffer such an ir-
retrievable loss during the waiting period, the Sosna decision seems
more suited to quantitative rather than qualitative analysis. It is
easy to see that in Shapiro a set dollar amount of benefits was ir-
retrievably lost, and that voting rights were lost in Dunn. Justice
Marshall's dissent in Sosna displayed concern over the Court's in-
sistence that the irretrievable loss of nonemergency medical care in
Memorial Hospital was substantially different from the mental peace
of mind lost by Mrs. Sosna during the waiting period.64
The inability to transform Mrs. Sosna's loss into a dollar
61. 419 U.S. at 406 (emphasis added).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 420-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. This analysis, however, ignores the severity of the deprivation suffered
by the divorce petitioner who is forced to wait a year for relief [citations
omitted]. The injury accompanying that delay is not directly measurable in
money terms like the loss of welfare benefits, but it cannot reasonably be
argued that when the year has elapsed, the petitioner is made whole. The
year's wait prevents remarriage and locks both partners into what may be an
intolerable, destructive relationship.
Id. at 421-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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amount as in Shapiro or into a discrete act of voting as in Dunn
foreshadows problems which can develop in reviewing other dura-
tional residency requirements. Applying the Sosna Court's mode of
analysis to a durational residency requirement for public housing,
for instance, produces an unclear result. Being forced to live in
substandard housing during the waiting period involves an irretriev-
able loss of dignity which cannot be expressed in tangible terms.
Whether this intangible loss is closer to Memorial Hospital or Sosna
is a matter of speculation.
As weak as the majority opinion is in this respect, it neverthe-
less avoids many of the analytical pitfalls to which the dissent fell
victim. Justice Marshall concluded that penalizing travel by delay-
ing access to divorce courts warranted application of the compelling-
interest test, since "the interests associated with marriage and di-
vorce have repeatedly been accorded particular deference, and the
right to marry has been termed 'one of the vital personal rights es-
sential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men'. 65
In support of its position, the dissent cited Boddie v. Connecti-
cut.66 In Boddie, the Court concluded that indigents who were
denied access to divorce courts because of their inability to pay
court costs had been denied due process of law.67 Several lower
65. Id. at 419-20.
66. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
67. In the district court, Mrs. Sosna relied exclusively on an equal protection
claim. In the Supreme Court, she cited Boddie in support of her contention that denial
of access to a divorce court was a deprivation of due process. Although Boddie found
a violation of due process to exist where court access was denied to indigents, that
holding was cast in extremely narrow terms. As Chief Justice Burger observed in his
concurring opinion in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), the interests involved
in Boddie were developed with "painstaking and precise delineation." 409 U.S. at
450 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The majority in Kras cautioned that Boddie went "no
further than necessary to dispose of the case before us," and did "not decide that
access for all individuals is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that its exercise may not be
placed beyond the reach of any individual." Id.
The fact that a divorce waiting period delays court access to persons seeking
divorces is not grounds in itself for putting divorce waiting periods within the ambit
of Boddie. Boddie rested on the fact that indigents were denied a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard. Quoting freely from prior cases, the Court pointed out that
"What the Constitution does require is 'an opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner'," 401 U.S. at 378, quoting from Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (Boddie Court's emphasis), "for [a] hearing appropri-
ate to the nature of the case. . . . "401 U.S. at 378, quoting from Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Boddie and the cases relied upon by
that decision as precedent dealt with absolute denials of access to the judicial process.
The problem, however, is not so easily solved. A question is presented as to how
long a waiting period may be before it results in denying a meaningful opportunity to
be heard. While a two-year residency requirement eventually permits access to a
divorce court, the spouses are forced to endure a legal relationship which has long
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courts confronted with divorce waiting period challenges gave par-
ticular attention to the description in Boddie of divorce as "affect-
ing fundamental human relationships, '68 and suggested that this
might be equivalent to a statement that divorce is a fundamental
right.69  Dictum to this effect is present in United States v. Kras70
and Ortwein v. Schwab.7 In Kras, the Court found that due pro-
cess was not violated when indigents could not afford court fees
necessary for a discharge from bankruptcy. In Ortwein, it was held
that due process was not violated when welfare recipients challeng-
ing a reduction in their payments could not afford to appeal an
administrative ruling upholding the decreased payments. In both
cases, the Court in distinguishing Boddie emphasized that divorce
involved a fundamental right and was therefore of greater constitu-
tional significance than the court access sought in Kras and Ort-
wein. The implications of classifying divorce as a fundamental right
are significant, since Dunn can be interpreted as saying that a pen-
alty on travel in the form of a denial of a fundamental right merits
the compelling-interest standard.72
In determining whether there is a fundamental right to a divorce,
it must be emphasized that the phrase "fundamental right" is a
term of art in equal protection adjudication, used only in conjunc-
tion with those rights which are constitutionally guaranteed."
Classifying divorce as a fundamental right on the basis of Boddie
can only be done by taking the word "fundamental" out of context.
The majority opinion in Boddie was written by Justice Harlan, an
ardent critic of that equal protection analysis which subjected penal-
ties on fundamental rights to the compelling-interest test.74  Under
since ceased to have significant meaning for them personally. In the end, the Court
could conceivably be placed in the position of drawing the line past which a meaning-
ful opportunity ceases to exist.
68. 401 U.S. at 383.
69. E.g., Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305, 308 n.5 (D.R.I. 1973); Mon Chi
Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219, 221 n.9 (D. Hawaii 1973).
70. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
71. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
72. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
73. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
74. For example, in his dissent in Shapiro, Justice Harlan conceded that inter-
state travel was a fundamental right. Nevertheless, he did not share the majority's
standard of review for the challenged durational residency statute. Under his view,
the only inquiry in an equal protection analysis should be that of the challenged
statute's rationality, unless a racial classification is involved.
Justice Harlan would have approached Shapiro the same way he did Boddie,
that is, in the context of due process. He developed his standards for this test in
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970):
An analysis under due process standards, correctly understood, is, in my
view, more conducive to judicial restraint than an approach couched in
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that equal protection approach, once a right is determined to be fun-
damental and the burden of justification is shifted to the state, it
is virtually a foregone conclusion that any statute restricting the
exercise of that right will be invalidated." Under Justice Harlan's
approach, the analysis should not end once the importance of the
right is determined, but rather a multitude of factors should be
subject to a balancing test. In view of this criticism, it is obvious
that cases which capitalize on Boddie's utilization of the word "fun-
damental" are taking that word out of the context of a flexible due
process analysis and placing it in a rigid equal protection frame of
reference. It can safely be said that if Justice Harlan had fore-
seen the consequences of using the word "fundamental," he would
have selected a different adjective.
By not classifying divorce as a fundamental right, the Sosna
majority avoided effecting a dynamic change in current divorce laws
in the United States. Since the Court has been explicit in its in-
sistence that any penalty on the exercise of a fundamental right
must be justified by a compelling state interest, classifying divorce
as a fundamental right would have necessitated strict scrutiny of
any statute which restricted one's opportunity to obtain a divorce.
In his dissent in United States v. Kras,7 6 Justice Marshall dem-
onstrated that he was aware of the implications of affording divorce
the protection given to fundamental rights:
I am intrigued by the majority's suggestion that because
granting a divorce impinges on "associational interests"
the right to a divorce is constitutionally protected. Are we
to require that state divorce laws serve compelling state
interests? For example, if a State chooses to allow divorces
only when one party is shown to have committed adultery,
must its refusal to allow them when the parties claim irrec-
oncilable differences be justified by some compelling state
interests?
77
slogans and ringing phrases, such as "suspect" classification or "invidious"
distinctions, or "compelling" state interest, that blur analysis by shifting the
focus away from the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to
which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative
means and purpose, the existence of alternative means for effectuating the
purpose, and the degree of confidence we may have that the statute reflects
the legislative concern for the purpose that would legitimately support the
means chosen.
75. One commentator has referred to the strict scrutiny test as "strict in theory
and fatal in fact." Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, Foreward to The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, 86 HARV. L. Rv. 1, 8 (1972). See also Goodpaster, The Constitution and
Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 479, 505 (1973).
76. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
77. Id. at 462 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
If divorce is a fundamental right, the Constitution would require
strict scrutiny of each aspect of the complex and varied divorce
laws of every state in order to ensure that the individual's funda-
mental right to a divorce was not subject to unnecessary restric-
tions.
Even though divorce is not a fundamental right, it is not neces-
sarily devoid of impact, since Shapiro and Memorial Hospital indi-
cate that the right to travel may be impermissibly penalized by im-
portant but nonfundamental rights. Yet apparently a residency
requirement for divorce does not involve a right substantial enough
to penalize. Why it does not and how this relates to other areas is
a matter of guesswork highlighting the shortcomings of current
right-to-travel analysis. The Court's result in Sosna was current but
the Court's opinion neglected to provide a badly needed new test.
Rather than relying on arbitrary value judgments the Court should
recognize the federalist values in which the right to travel finds its
origin: the promotion of national unity balanced against the preser-
vation of limited state autonomy.
78
The right to travel promotes national unity by ensuring a per-
son's right of free movement between states. However, in dealing
with an after-the-fact penalty on travel rather than with a direct
restriction upon movement, a new perspective is necessary, since
after-the-fact penalities are often the byproduct of a state's good
faith effort to regulate internal affairs. Rather than futilely attempt-
ing to develop a single formula into which the variables of any
right-to-travel case can be inserted, the Court should focus on pa-
rameters which distinguish various penalties from each other.
It should be recognized that the type of movement the Court
has sought to protect is the right "to [migrate] with intent to
settle and abide. 79  Therefore, one relevant inquiry should be
whether the benefit withheld by a durational residency require-
ment is one which cannot be enjoyed unless a person has an intent
to settle and abide.
Applying this approach to a durational residency requirement for
public housing, it should be obvious that a person who wishes to
live in public housing has an intent to settle and abide. The bene-
fit deprived by the waiting period is one which can only be en-
joyed by a continuous residency, and therefore, the required length
of residency should be ruled unconstitutional. Similar reasoning
78. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV L. REV. 43, 116 (1974).
79. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974). See Cole
v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807, 811 (1st Cir. 1970) ("travel" defined as "migra-
tion with intent to settle and abide").
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could invalidate durational residency requirements for practicing
particular professions.
Where the benefit subject to a durational residency requirement
can be enjoyed without settling and abiding, states have a very real
concern that the benefit may be exploited by transients having no
desire to remain permanently. The federalist value of preserving
limited state autonomy justifies allowing states greater leeway in
drawing distinctions between residents and nonresidents in this area,
in order to ensure that the states' resources are not exploited.
Another factor to be considered is whether a state has been
subject to a pattern of exploitation by transients. If so, the promo-
tion of national unity achieved by removing penalties on travel can
only be secured at the cost of either allowing the depletion of state
resources, or some other disadvantage. Sosna fits into this cate-
gory; Shapiro, Memorial Hospital, and Dunn do not, since there
was no such showing in those cases.
Finally, the Court should weigh the amount of deference which
has been traditionally afforded states in legislating in the particular
area which is the subject of the durational residency requirement.
Although it was not explicitly mentioned in Sosna, an undercurrent
of the majority's position was that divorce has been the almost
exclusive domain of state legislatures, ° a factor which several
lower courts considered significant in upholding the constitutional-
ity of divorce durational residency statutes. 81
The Court's reluctance to interfere in matters involving divorce
legislation is paralleled in other areas of the law. 82 Abstention of
this type does not stand for the proposition that tradition is self-
justifying. What is significant is that the Court's reluctance to enter
these areas rests on a realization that courts are inappropriate
forums for the resolution of certain types of disputes. As the Court
observed in Rodriguez in the context of tax legislation, "we con-
tinue to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the
80. See 419 U.S. at 409. Cases affirming the autonomy of the states in divorce
legislation include Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190 (1888); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 582 (1858). See also Druen v. Druen, 247 F. Supp. 754 (D. Colo. 1965),
where it was held that a suit for divorce is not removable from state court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 even though diversity of citizenship and the requisite jurisdictional
amount are shown to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
81. Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Fla. 1973), affd sub nom.
Makres v. Askew, 500 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1974); Ashley v. Ashley, 191 Neb. 824,
217 N.W.2d 926 (1974).
82. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (social welfare plan); San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (state tax legislation); Labine
v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (descent and distribution).
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expertise and familiarity with local problems so necessary to the
making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition
of public revenues. 83  In other areas of the law where they are
similarly ill-equipped, courts should be hesitant to strike down dura-
tional residency requirements which impose after-the-fact penalties
on travel.
These three factors, an intent to settle and abide, demonstrated
exploitation of a state's resources by transients, and traditional def-
erence to states in particular types of legislation, are designed to
present a flexible means of determining what penalties on travel
are unconstitutional. Concededly, cases may develop in the future
for which the proposed test might be inappropriate, but no test
can be designed to meet every possible contingency. This test
represents an improvement over the vague language contained in
right-to-travel cases and offers discernible standards by which to
judge alleged penalties on travel.
Despite the flaws in the legal analysis of Sosna, the reasons
underlying a divorce waiting period justify the holding. The ma-
jority found several state interests justifying the existence of a di-
vorce durational residency statute. Because of the ramifications of a
divorce proceeding, the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring
that the divorce-seeking spouse has more than a temporary connec-
tion with the state. Property rights must be determined and cus-
tody and support problems concerning the children must be re-
solved. Another reason for the necessary connection between state
and spouse is the right of another state to subject the divorce decree
to collateral attack. Full faith and credit need not be extended to
a divorce decree when the granting state lacks the "nexus between
person and place of such permanence as to control the creation of
legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance. 84
Finally, by demanding a connection, the state prevents forum-
shopping in divorce actions.
An issue which was not confronted by the majority was whether
the state's interests could be satisfied by a finding of domicile in-
stead of the more stringent demands of a durational residency re-
quirement. Rather than insisting upon proof that a waiting period
constituted a more effective solution, the Court relied on the "quite
permissible inference"8 5 that a durational residency requirement
83. 411 U.S. at 41. For example, in Memorial Hospital it was shown that one
county in Arizona operated without a durational residency requirement and ex-
perienced no dire consequences.
84. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
85. 419 U.S. at 393.
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was better suited than domicile for accomplishing the state's goals.
The best explanation for this is that since the Court was only look-
ing for a rational basis, there was no need to search for less drastic
alternatives. It can be demonstrated, however, that regardless of
the standard of review applied, a divorce waiting period is a more
effective means of promoting state interests than is proof of domi-
cile alone.
The superiority of a durational residency requirement over proof
of domicile in the divorce area requires consideration of the problem
of forum-shopping. It has been estimated that one in every ten di-
vorces in the United States is a migratory divorce.86 A result of
this phenomenon has been the creation of a dual system of law:
one for the immobile, who must abide by the laws of their own state,
and another for the more affluent, who are able to finance a trip to a
forum with laws more sympathetic to their specific marital diffi-
culties.87  By imposing waiting periods and thus hindering the mi-
gratory divorce patterns of the affluent, the states are able to equalize
the impact of the divorce laws on rich and poor.
In Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 8 the Hawaii district court con-
cluded that a statutory waiting period was not a permissible means
of deterring forum-shopping. The district court was persuaded that
instead, "the existence of a myriad of tangible criteria highly rele-
vant to bona fides of domicile" 89 provided a more appropriate means
to determine domicile without penalizing travel.90 Justice Marshall,
dissenting in Sosna, also felt that proof of domicile was the proper
method for controlling forum-shopping. 91
Several shortcomings to the "tangible criteria" means of deter-
86. H. CARTER & P. GLICK, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A SOCIAL AND Eco-
NOMIC STUDY 373 (1970). "Migratory divorce" has been defined as "a divorce
obtained by a person traveling to another jurisdiction, which has less stringent divorce
requirements than his own, for the purpose of obtaining a divorce decree, with the
intention of returning to his normal home once the purpose is accomplished." Note,
44 IOWA L. REV. 765, 765 n.3 (1959).
87. In his dissent in Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), Justice Frankfurter
noted that a migratory divorce "offers a way out only to that small portion of those
unhappily married who are sufficiently wealthy to be able to afford a trip to Nevada or
Florida, and a six-week or three-month stay there." Id. at 370. In an accompanying
footnote he added: "For comparable instances, in the past, of discrimination against
the poor in the actual application of divorce laws, cf. Dickens, Hard Times, c.11."
Id. at 370 n.18.
88. 360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973).
89. Id. at 222.
90. Alternatives suggested by the court were purchasing or renting living quarters
for a period comparable to or in excess of the waiting period, securing a permanent
job, registering a car, or obtaining a driver's license. Id. at 222 n.14.
91. 419 U.S. at 424.
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mining domicile were suggested by the Lum court and the Sosna
dissent. Just as one who fails to satisfy a durational residency
statute may well be a bona fide domiciliary, so too might a person
who does not register his car, obtain a new driver's license, and so
on.92  Additionally, the ineffectiveness of suggested alternatives to
waiting periods as a means of deterring forum-shopping is apparent.
Renting temporary housing, registering children in school, resign-
ing club memberships, and other "tangible criteria" of residency
hardly present formidable obstacles to a person intent on obtaining
a divorce.93
Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospital rejected waiting periods
as permissible means of determining domicile, but each is distin-
guishable from the Sosna problem. In both Shapiro and Dunn,
there was ready proof of viable alternatives, because the states al-
ready had at their disposal active factfinding mechanisms designed
to ascertain the bona fides of an applicant's residence. In Shapiro,
investigations were performed by welfare agencies, 94 and in Dunn,
the task fell to an army of registration personnel. 95 In Memorial
Hospital, the Court could point to objective evidence that the stat-
ute in question was ineffective because, in another situation, resi-
dency requirements had been removed as qualifications for indigent
medical treatment without dire consequences. 9'
The active factfinding agencies available in the fact settings of
Shapiro and Dunn should be contrasted with the passive role of the
92. Cf. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 107-08
n.23 (1971).
93. One divorce manual advises:
If you try to establish domicile in an "easy" divorce state your intent to live
there may be more easily proven if you look for a job there, take out a library
card, open charge accounts, and register for a course at the local college or
university. All these seemingly trivial acts help to document your intent to
be domiciled.
F. HAUSSAMEN & M. GUITAR, THE DIVORCE HANDBOOK 149 (1960) (emphasis
added).
The consequences resulting from a system which places reliance upon such "trivial
acts" have been cogently noted:
Some say this allegation [domicile] amounts to perjury; others that it is like
those allegations made under the common-law forms of action that in time
came to be disregarded and did not require proof-a ritual, not a matter of
conscience; all are aware that the appearance in the second state is a sub-
terfuge.
A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 1486 (1965).
94. 394 U.S. at 636.
95. 405 U.S. at 346-48.
96. 415 U.S. at 267-68 & n.30. The Court observed that in Pinal County, Ari-
zona, a public hospital had been enjoined from demanding satisfaction of the dura-
tional residency requirement in Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz.
1971), with no disastrous consequences resulting.
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court in an ex parte divorce action, where the court merely con-
fines itself to reviewing the evidence submitted to it by an obviously
interested witness. Furthermore, while in Memorial Hospital the
Court observed that harmful consequences did not result from the
removal of the residency requirement in one Arizona county, those
states which have removed or shortened their divorce residency re-
quirements provide well-documented examples of increases in
forum-shopping, despite the prerequisite of a court determination
of domicile.9 7
It has been contended that forum-shopping could be prevented
if courts applied a divorce law different from that of the forum. 98
A spouse recently arrived within a state would have immediate ac-
cess to the divorce courts of that state, but the threat of migratory
divorces could be countered by applying the law of the last common
domicile. This proposal raises several problems. The first is de-
termining what law is to be applied.99 It is conceivable that, with
a population as highly mobile as that of the United States, no other
state would have more significant contacts with the husband and
wife than the forum state.
An even more persuasive argument is that applying the law of an
alternate forum fails to confront the basic equal protection issue.
If one accepts the proposition that a durational residency statute is
a penalty on a class of persons who have recently traveled inter-
state, so too is the practice of applying a dual system of divorce
laws: one for established residents, and one for newcomers. This is
a denial of equal protection of the laws in its most classic form.
Finally, it is significant that one of the ultimate solutions pro-
posed to the generalized problem of forum-shopping is none other
than a durational residency requirement:
97. P. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 103-09 (1959); Note,
75 HARV. L. REV. 549 (1962).
It has been contended that a durational residency requirement is subject to the
same criticism as any other means of proving domicile, that is, if a person is intent on
perjuring himself as to his domiciliary intent, he will also lie about length of resi-
dency. Fiorentino v. Probate Court, 310 N.E.2d 112, 118 (Mass. 1974). While this
appears to be a valid criticism, experience with relaxed durational residency require-
ments does not support it. As the above-cited authorities demonstrate, divorces have
significantly increased in states which have relaxed their durational residency re-
quirements despite the retention of the demand that domiciliary intent be proven.
The somewhat perplexing conclusion is that persons seeking migratory divorces ap-
pear to be willing to lie about the abstract concept of domiciliary intent, but are
hesitant to lie about a concrete factor such as length of residency.
98. Note, Constitutionality of Divorce Durational Residency Requirements, 51
TExAs L. REV. 585, 591 (1973).
99. Cf. A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 244 (1962).
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Reforms can consist of a very simple development. The
requirement of a minimum residence time is today the
chief vehicle for correcting the scope of divorce jurisdic-
tion. Uniform drafts have acknowledged its importance
and insisted that the minimum should be one or two years.
This requirement ought to be freed from the wild-growth
tendrils with which it is surrounded, and it should be en-
forced with the utmost rigidity.'00
The need to prevent forum-shopping should not be taken lightly.
If divorce waiting periods had been invalidated in Sosna, states
such as Iowa with liberalized divorce laws would be forced to re-
consider their positions after the increasing popularity of those
states as divorce forums became apparent. Of even greater concern
is the deterrent effect such a decision would have on states con-
templating much needed reforms in divorce legislation. Further-
more, if faced with the possibility of extensive forum-shopping,
states would be hesitant to try experimental programs designed to
alleviate the divorce problem.
Another state interest which Sosna and the previous lower court
cases failed to discuss was the relationship between a required
length of residency and a court's jurisdictional power over the
spouses in a divorce action. It is the prevailing view in the United
States that at least one of the spouses must be domiciled within a
state before a court has jurisdiction to issue a binding divorce de-
cree.' O' This is attributable to the fact that divorce has traditionally
been viewed as being in the nature of an in rem action, with the
marital relationship constituting the res.' °2 While the origin of the
rule is uncertain, 10 3 in time it was accepted that the state of domicile
of either party was best suited to effect a change in marital status,
and domicile emerged as a jurisdictional prerequisite. 0 4  Viewed
100. E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 460 (2d ed.
1958).
101. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 191 (1971).
102. See, e.g., Houston v. Timmerman, 17 Ore. 499, 505, 21 P. 1037, 1039
(1889); Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856).
103. Authorities are unsure of the source of the domicile requirement, but it was
well established by the time Justice Story's Commentaries were published in 1834.
Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled?, 18 IND. L.J. 165, 166 (1943); Stimson,
Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of the Domiciliary Theory, 42
A.B.A.J. 222 (1956).
104. If the domicile requirement is satisfied, jurisdiction exists.
Even though the marriage was not celebrated in the forum, the spouses
never lived there as husband and wife, none of the facts upon which the
divorce is based occurred in the forum, and even though the other spouse
does not appear in the action and there is no other basis for in personam
jurisdiction over the absent spouse.
WEINTRAUB, supra note I01, at 174.
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in this context, a durational residency requirement serves as objec-
tive evidence of domicile.
The Supreme Court has never been called upon to decide if
domicile is the only constitutionally acceptable contact between a
state and the marital relationship which warrants the exercise of
divorce jurisdiction.'0 5 In recognition of this fact, several state
courts have upheld divorces where jurisdiction was predicated on
residency alone.
10 6
The importance of this issue emerges upon recognition of several
points. First, since many servicemen are unable to meet the tech-
nical requirements of domicile, special statutes have come into
existence allowing courts to exercise divorce jurisdiction over ser-
vicemen once a durational residency requirement is satisfied, regard-
less of domicile. Second, domicile has been subjected to increas-
ing criticism as a jurisdictional basis because it is unresponsive to
the needs of contemporary society. Durational residency require-
ments have been suggested as a solution. With these two caveats
in mind, it should be noted that other than domicile, a required
length of residency provides the only viable jurisdictional basis in
divorce actions.
If the Sosna dissent had prevailed, a serious problem would have
arisen in states which have servicemen's divorce laws. A member
of the armed forces is an inherent transient. Since he might be
required to relocate upon a moment's notice, a serviceman "de-
velops a habit of looking forward to living in the future in different
places . . .which is quite consistent with never settling down in one
place as in a chosen home."'0 7 The legal presumption that where a
person actually lives is his domicile cannot arise in the case of a ser-
viceman who does not have a choice of domicile.' 8 Because of this,
while it is theoretically possible for a serviceman to establish domi-
105. This should not be confused with the Court's holding in Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), that "each state, by virtue of its command over its
domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of marriage, can alter within its
own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled there, even though the
other spouse is absent." Id. at 298-99. It is possible that a divorce not based on
domicile is valid in the decree rendering state even though it is not entitled to full
faith and credit. Id. at 302. See Rodgers & Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit: The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 1363 (1967).
106. For instance, a number of state courts have permitted military personnel
and their wives to obtain divorces in the state in which the serviceman was sta-
tioned. Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24 (Alas. 1964); Wheat v. Wheat, 229
Ark. 842, 318 S.W. 2d 793 (1958); Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020
(1958); Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959).
107. J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 155 (1935).
108. 2A W. NELSON, NELSON ON DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 21.25 (2d ed. 1961).
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cile in the state where he is stationed, the requisite proof of intent
to supplement physical presence is often extremely difficult to pro-
duce.'0 9
When domicile was viewed as the only permissible jurisdiction-
al basis for a divorce action, servicemen in many states were denied
the opportunity to seek a divorce." 0 The only option open to a
serviceman confronted by this obstacle would be a return to the state
of his legal domicile."' The time and expense involved in this deci-
sion might prove to be an insurmountable barrier. In addition, his
original place of domicile might have less contact with the marriage
than the residency state, and it certainly would have less concern
with custody and alimony problems.
Many states have reacted to the serviceman's dilemma with spe-
cial statutes granting jurisdiction in divorce actions over a member
of the armed forces after he has lived within the state for a certain
period, regardless of domicile.12 The Supreme Court of Texas
stated the case for upholding these statutes:
The State of Texas is hardly less concerned with the do-
mestic relations of persons required to live in this state in-
definitely under military orders, oftentimes for a period of
years, with the protection and support of their children and
property interests, and the adjustment of their marital re-
sponsibilities at stake than it is with similar problems of
those who have acquired a domicile here in the orthodox
sense. In many cases, if not in the majority, the courts of
this state only can deal adequately with these problems and
afford appropriate relief." 3
Were domicile to become the only permissible jurisdictional basis,
states would once more be confronted with the problem of military
divorces.
None of the jurisdictions in which divorce waiting periods have
been overturned has a servicemen's divorce statute. In view of the
fact that a national constitution is being interpreted, however, con-
sideration must be given to the problems in all states. Elimination
of divorce durational residency statutes would have the consequence
of denying many servicemen access to a divorce court. It is difficult
109. See cases cited in id. at 345 n.8; Note, 13 Sw. L.J. 233, 236-38 (1959).
110. See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, 205 Iowa 108, 109-10, 215 N.W. 661, 662 (1927).
111. As a general rule, a person does not lose his old domicile until he acquires a
new one. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 10 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
LEFLAR].
112. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.160 (1973) (serviceman continuously stationed
at military base for one year deemed resident in good faith). See note 106 supra.
113. Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 355, 320 S.W.2d 807, 811 (1959).
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to see how this can be justified as necessary to prevent penalties
on travel.
1 4
It is possible to argue that the issue raised by servicemen's di-
vorce statutes could have been solved by making them an exception
to the rule that divorce waiting periods are unconstitutional. This
contention is viable, however, only if it is assumed that domicile is
generally a satisfactory jurisdictional basis for divorce, when in fact
a domicile requirement for divorce is out of step with the current
mobile society. At the time that domicile was picked as the juris-
dictional basis for divorce, the choice rested on a sound foundation.
This contact point was chosen because the domiciliary
state was viewed as the one with the principal interest.
And the choice was a good one for at that time domicile
was a legal term of established meaning and stability.
When a person was a domiciliary of a place, he was a mem-
ber of that community and there were permanent attach-
ments and connections."
5
The stability of early 19th-century family life presented a sharp con-
trast to today's society. Yet the domicile requirement remains, even
though its underlying rationale has vanished. As one commentator
noted:
[D]omicile is a patently deficient test in our suitcase society.
A nebulous intention to create a new home, either perma-
nently or indefinitely, requires nothing more than a "men-
tal flash." A domiciliary may have arrived yesterday. He
may be gone tomorrow. He may in fact, never have ap-
peared on the scene at all. The growth of an itinerant and
mobile population has seriously undermined the utility of a
concept requiring a settled connection with a place called
home.
116
The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts is representative of the dis-
content with domicile. In a change of position from the First Re-
statement, domicile is no longer considered to be essential to di-
vorce jurisdiction. Instead, a court has jurisdiction in a divorce
action "if either spouse has such a relationship to the state as would
114. If divorce is a fundamental right as some courts have contended, then a
serviceman may have a constitutional right to demand that divorce jurisdiction be
predicated on a durational residency requirement, lest he be denied access to a
divorce court because of his inability to establish a domicile. Baade, Marriage and
Divorce in American Conflicts Law: Governmental-Interests Analysis and the Re-
statement (Second), 72 COLUM. L. Rav. 329, 337 (1972).
115. Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-Present Doctrine and
Possible Changes, 9 VAND. L. REV. 1, 13 (1955).
116. Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 105, at 1388.
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make it reasonable for the state to dissolve the marriage."' 7 It is
unclear what reasonable relationships are envisioned. As the Com-
ment to that section points out, there is a lack of authority on the
subject. The Reporter suggests that a one-year residency require-
ment would be most appropriate."'
While domicile is still the most widely accepted basis for divorce
jurisdiction, there is no reason to assume that the status quo will
perpetuate itself. The growing awareness of the shortcomings of
domicile, reflected by the position of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts, offers a strong argument for allowing the states flexibil-
ity in choosing what should be the jurisdictional basis for a divorce
action.
Other than a durational residency requirement, there are no
viable alternative jurisdictional bases. Consider, for example, the
alternative of conferring divorce jurisdiction on the state of the mar-
riage. Since the validity of a marriage is determined by the law of
the state of celebration, it could be argued that the state retains a
special interest in the marital status of the husband and wife. Until
recently, New York adhered to this position. The state was viewed
as having a permanent basis for divorce jurisdiction if the spouses
had been married in New York, even though they had since ceased
to be domiciled there." 9 The validity of this practice was affirmed
in David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss:
20
In what must certainly be a large percentage of cases, the
place where a marriage takes place is the place where the
parties establish their home and the place where the chil-
dren are born; and even where they both thereafter leave
that place and go their respective ways in different places,
the fact that they were married in a particular place seems
to me to supply a nexus between those persons and that
place which is at least as intimate and permanent as the
domicile of either one of them in any other State would
supply between them and that place.'
2 1
The nexus found by the Zieseniss court is in many cases a sub-
stantial fiction. The spouses often leave the state of celebration
years before a divorce is even considered. It has been observed
that the marriage ceremony may be the only contact a state has
with the spouses because the site of marriage is often selected "in
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 72 (1971).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, Reporter's Note § 72, at 221-22
(1971).
119. L. 1962, c. 313, § 7 (1963); as amended N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 230 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1974-75). Site of the marriage is a jurisdictional basis in annulment
proceedings. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 559 (1968).
120. 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
121. Id. at 844, 129 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
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jest, fortuitously, or without reasonable purpose."'122 More signifi-
cantly, if the husband or wife has moved a considerable distance
from the state of marriage, great difficulty and expense could ac-
company an attempted return. In view of the extreme mobility
of American society, divorce jurisdiction based on the site of mar-
riage would pose a cumbersome jurisdictional prerequisite.
Justice Marshall's dissent suggested the alternative to domicile
of personal service. He could envision no reason for imposing a
durational residency requirement if both parties were before the
court. This procedure would be superior to a domicile requirement
insofar as it would eliminate the need for an inquiry into the intent
of the spouse. Nevertheless, Professor Ehrenzweig has persuasive-
ly argued that personal jurisdiction is particularly inappropriate in
divorce actions:
Such a jurisdiction has become an anachronism even as to
money claims, and would be monstrous, in the law of di-
vorce. It could, on the one hand, trap a defendant on a
pleasure or business trip in a state with a hospitable di-
vorce law; and on the other hand, force the plaintiff to hunt
his opponent all through the country to serve him with
process.
123
There can be little doubt that forum-shopping would be encour-
aged by this alternative. A husband and wife seeking a divorce,
but prevented from doing so because of the stringent laws of their
own state, could make a short trip to another state with more fa-
vorable laws. One party could serve the other with process, and
both could return to their home state until another brief appearance
was required on the day of the trial. While this may be attractive
to persons able to afford the cost of a trip to a more favorable juris-
diction, it would result in a dramatic increase in the existing in-
equities for the less affluent with limited mobility who do not have the
same choice of laws.
124
A final alternative might be to confer jurisdiction on the state
122. Sumner, supra note 115, at 15. But see Developments in the Law-State
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 972 n.374 (1960).
There is one situation, however, in which the state of marriage may have a
substantial interest in the stability of the marriage, and that is when the
wife's family resides there, in which case the wife may well return to that
state after the divorce, and might have to be supported by the state or its
residents if no provision is made for her support incident to the divorce.
Id.
Nevertheless, this hardly strengthens the case for the state of marriage, as it predi-
cates jurisdiction on what is at best a contingency.
123. A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 71, at 237
(1962).
124. For a discussion of forum-shopping see notes 86-100 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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where the offenses took place leading to the divorce. States have
traditionally declined to view divorce as merely the termination
of an incompatible relationship. Instead, a finding of fault is in-
sisted upon, and a divorce action necessitates a search for a "guilty"
spouse who has committed "offenses" justifying a severing of the
marital bonds. Consequently, states at one time favored divorce
jurisdiction of that state within whose boundaries the offenses
were committed. 125 One example of this outdated practice is pro-
vided by a Colorado statute which, before its amendment in 1973,126
permitted waiver of a one-year residency requirement when the grounds
for the action were "adultery or cruelty, where the offense was com-
mitted within this state."
127
As is the case with the site of the marriage and the personal
presence bases, the site of the guilty act does not present a viable
alternative basis for divorce jurisdiction. A system of fault jurisdic-
tion necessarily limits the grounds for divorce to discrete acts which
can be traced to a particular place and time. Alcoholism, mental
cruelty, and other grounds for divorce of a continuing character
whose origin cannot be pinpointed to a specific jurisdiction would be
eliminated.128 Additionally, it would be impossible to implement
such a jurisdictional system in a state which recognizes "no-fault"
divorce. Consider, for example, the Iowa statute of this type which
provides for dissolution of the marriage "to the extent that the legit-
imate objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains
no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved."
129
If a search for fault is necessary, a spouse suing for divorce on this
ground would be permanently denied access to a divorce court.
A consequence of Sosna is that the states will be allowed a high
degree of flexibility in dealing with the jurisdictional basis for di-
vorce actions. In effect, the Court has reaffirmed the principle
that matters of divorce policy are state concerns, leaving Boddie v.
Connecticut as the sole exception to the rule. While this result is
admirable, it is unfortunate that the contours of the right-to-travel
doctrine still remain to be defined. Sosna is persuasive evidence that
there is a need for a new direction for the right to travef.
DONALD CYBULSKI
125. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 123, at 238.
126. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-106 (1973).
127. C.L. § 5597 (1963).
128. NELSON, supra note 108, at 356.
129. IowA CODE ANN. § 598.5 (Supp. 1973).
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